Capital accumulation has long been considered one of the driving forces behind economic growth. The idea that democratic experience accumulates and depreciates like other forms of capital is a relatively unexplored idea. Much like financial and physical capital, it has been suggested that democracy is a necessary but insufficient condition for economic growth.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a standing tenant of growth theory that capital is an essential component. This capital comes in many forms including physical, human, and financial capital. For any form of capital to grow there must be continuous investment in excess of depreciation and other losses.
A relatively new idea is that democracy can be thought of as a form of capital. The idea of democratic capital is that the more experience or history a country has with a democratic system, the more likely that country is to develop and maintain the institutions of democracy. Although democracy and free-markets are not synonymous, there is a very strong correlation between these two ideas.
The purpose of this paper is to more clearly identify the impact of democratic capital on prosperity. I begin by recreating a basic measure of democratic capital based on the work of Persson and Tabellini (2006b) . I then suggest and calculate alternative measures of democratic capital. Using these measures of democratic capital, I measure the impact of democratic capital on prosperity, measured as GDP per capita. Finally, I identify the direction of the relationship between democratic capital, economic freedom, and GDP per capita.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The positive connection between democracy and capitalism has been believed for many years. Almond (1991) provides a survey of economists' views on this relationship. Among those economists is Schumpeter who suggests that democracy is supportive of capitalism. The counter argument by Marx that there will always be a tension between democracy and capitalism has proven invalid, or at the very least, inconsequential. However, understanding and quantifying this relationship is a matter that has only been addressed in the past few decades. Helliwell's (1994) analysis of the relationship between democracy and growth is the basis of most of the literature in this line if inquiry. Helliwell looked at 125 countries from 1960 to 1985 and determined that income has a positive impact on democracy and that democracy has a positive but indirect affect on growth through increases in education and investment. A multitude of papers follow which suggest different measurements and/or model specifications. These differences result in mixed results on the nature of the relationship between democracy and growth.
There are many papers that identify a positive correlation between democracy and growth. Arat (1988) identifies the positive correlation but determines that economic growth is not a sufficient condition for democracy. Alesina and Perotti (1994) find that there is a strong positive correlation between democracy, GDP per capita, and education. Alesina and Perotti then turn their focus to the stability of political regimes rather than the structure, finding that instability reduces growth regardless of the type of regime. However, Feng (1997) determines that democracy reduces the probability of a regime change and thus indirectly promotes growth through stability.
Taking a different approach, Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) use Granger causality to determine that growth Granger causes democracy but democracy does not Granger cause growth.
This causality relationship holds up even in the poorest countries. However, Heo and Tan (2001) suggest that the relationship between democracy and growth could go either way and use Granger causality on 32 individual, developing countries. Heo and Tan find that 34 percent show growth Granger causing democracy, 31 percent show democracy Granger causing growth, 9 percent show a feedback loop, and 25 percent show no relationship.
Most recently, Persson and Tabellini have produced a series of working papers looking at the relationship of democracy and growth. In their 2006 paper they look at the experience a country has with democracy, identifying that experience as "democratic capital." They use this idea of democratic capital for a country and its neighbors to model the probability of a country becoming democratic and the probability of staying democratic. They find a "dynamic, positive feedback loop" between democratic capital and growth. They find that becoming a democracy accelerates growth by 0.75 percentage point and that this affect is still positive and significant when paired with market reforms. In their 2007 paper they suggest that previous measures of the effects of democracy on growth have been significantly underestimated. They find that the positive impact of democracy is up to 1.8 times greater than any previously reported estimates and the negative impact of autocracy is at least 1.8 times greater than previous estimates.
III. MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITAL
Quantifying the accumulation of democratic capital, or any other type of institutional capital, is full of challenges. The most obvious challenge is accounting for periods of external control. I approached this challenge as having several possibilities. The first possibility is that a nation is formed after being a colony. The second possibility is that a nation is in existence but is occupied and controlled by another country for a period of time. The third possibility is that a smaller nation splits from a larger existing nation. Finally, there is the possibility that two or more nations join together.
The case where a country splits from a larger country seems the easiest to handle. A country like Bangladesh, that was part of Pakistan until 1972, shares a democratic and institutional history with Pakistan. So when Bangladesh became its own country in 1972, it started with the same democratic capital as Pakistan at that time. The opposite of this is where two or more countries join together to form one country. This is the case for Germany that was once split between East and West. For this situation, the current country shares both histories. For these cases I use the simple average of the countries' democratic capital during the period(s) of separation 1 . For countries that were formerly colonies, there is evidence that the legal institutions tend to stick.
The same cannot be said for political institutions. For that reason, I calculate democratic capital for former colonies starting from zero at the time they become an independent country.
The most interesting challenge is for countries that are occupied and controlled by another country. This situation has occurred to many countries and on several occasions. The most glaring examples are the countries of the former Soviet Union. Many of these countries were independent and democratic before they were overtaken. During the period of foreign control there are two possibilities regarding democracy. People either buy into or accept the new regime or they resist and resent the change. It seems unlikely that democratic capital can grow in this scenario but it is also not realistic to assume that the country takes on the democratic capital of its oppressors. Therefore, for these situations the democratic capital accumulated before occupation is simply depreciated while occupied. For the purposes of this paper, I concern myself only with the domestic measure of democratic capital. To calculate democratic capital, Persson and Tabellini use the Polity II value to identify if a country is democratic or autocratic. If a country has a positive Polity II value then it is considered democratic. To calculate the democratic capital, countries receive a 1 each year they are democratic, 0 otherwise, but depreciate only in years of autocracy. They estimate a depreciation rate between 0.06 and 0.01. Like Persson and Tabellini, I will use the depreciation rate of 0.06 for δ throughout the remainder of the paper.
The binary variable of democracy is represented in formula 1 as D t . The stock of democratic capital is represented as DC t-1 . My calculations based on this method 2 , identified as Binary, are reported for select countries in Table 1 .
(
This calculation is a good place to start. A potential problem with this measure is that it only depreciates democratic capital in years of autocracy. In contrast, when we look at other types of capital accumulation, depreciation of the capital stock occurs every year. Beyond this technical argument, there is an idea in the public choice literature that suggests people become complacent in their valuation of democracy. That is, the longer they live in a democracy, the more they take it for granted. Van Den Doel and Van Velthoven (1993) support this idea with theory and evidence. In particular, they describe Olson's model of participation in democracy as supporting very low participation when policy is either very near optimal or very far from optimal. When policy is near optimal, people believe things will continue to go well so their participation is unnecessary. When policy is far from optimal, people believe their contributions will have no impact so refrain from participation. With these arguments in mind I calculate a second measure of democratic capital, identified as Binary Depreciated, based on formula 2.
Both of the measures produced to this point have been based on a binary value of whether a country is democratic or autocratic in a given year. The Polity II values that this binary is calculated from can provide more information. The Polity II value ranges from negative ten to positive ten. This scale provides more information (and potentially reduces measurement error)
in that two countries may be considered democratic because they have positive Polity II values but one may have a score of 2 while the other has a score of 8, implying that the second is far more democratic than the first. 
Graphic Analysis
For the graphic analysis, I compare five countries: China, Estonia, United States, Venezuela, and
Zimbabwe. These five countries represent a wide range of political histories and economic prosperity. I first look at the Binary democratic capital versus the Polity II measure. This visual inspection confirms the general accuracy of the measures as we see the US at the top and China at the bottom. It is more interesting to note that Venezuela is above Estonia in both measures.
However, a closer look at the Polity II measure reveals Estonia to be on a steep upward path 4 while Venezuela's path is headed downward. If we revisit this data in 50 years and both countries stay on their current trajectories, Estonia will have greater democratic capital than Venezuela. This again supports the idea that there is a strong relationship between democratic capital and economic freedom, though that relationship may be lagged. 
Although it is difficult to interpret the exact relationships between the variables, because of the large variation in units, the relationships are positive and statistically significant with the exception of democratic capital. The binary measure of democratic capital is the only version that is statistically significant. This is a first hint that how democratic capital is measured will be important to our results. One might challenge the use of OLS or the AR(1) disturbances. As robustness check, I ran the same OLS regression without the AR(1) disturbances as well as GLS with and without the AR(1) disturbances. There is little variation in the results of these alternate methods.
To have a better understanding of the relationship, I rerun the regression using logged values.
Using the logged values results in all of the democratic capital measures being statistically significant, though some are weakly significant and all are relatively small. From these results
we can see that GDP per capita is highly dependent on previous period GDP per capita values.
For economic freedom, we see that a 1 percent increase in economic freedom is associated with an approximate increase in GDP per capita of 0.1 percent. The impact of a 1 percent increase in democratic capital is less than a tenth of a percent. Another approach to this type of problem is to use an Arellano-Bond estimation. In this method, past realizations of the dependent variable affect its current level and past realizations, beyond the specified lag(s), of the independent variables are used as instrumental variables. The results of the Arellano-Bond estimation are presented in Table 5 6 and are very similar to the previous results. This provides yet another robustness check. All of the coefficients are still positive and statistically significant. The primary difference is the estimated impact of democratic capital is larger while the impact of economic freedom and previous GDP per capita coefficient estimates are smaller under this method.
Table 4 -Estimates of Equation 3 with Logs
This set of results has at least two major implications. The first is that democratic capital may not directly affect GDP, or the direct affect is relatively small. This is not a surprising result, as it has been suggested by Feng (1997) , Helliwell (1994) , and Leblang (1996) that the impact of democracy is indirect. The second, and more important, implication is that how you measure democratic capital, and democracy by extension, impacts the statistical significance of your results. This supports the implications of the graphic analysis of Figures 1 and 2 in section 4.1. The body of research in this area often goes back and forth as to whether democracy is important. The results here suggest that those papers that are based on different measures of democracy are likely to get different results. This is particularly poignant when one considers the first two results here; Tables 3 and 4 7 are based on the exact same data and econometric approach but result in different estimates. Using different econometric methods, as presented in Table 5 , simply adds to the confusion. 7 The model in Table 4 is not estimated using logged values of Polity II Democratic Capital. See the previous footnote.
Granger Causality
Clearly, the three variables of GDP per capita, economic freedom and democratic capital are closely connected. There is a strong theoretical connection that has been demonstrated both graphically and statistically in this paper. This begs the question of which one causes the others to move. The standard approach to answering this question is Granger causality tests. Table 6 -Granger Causality using VAR on Binary Democratic Capital 
Another observation from these results is that improvements in these factors seem to be selfperpetuating. That is, increases in democracy supports increases of economic freedom which, in turn, supports increases in democracy and GDP which then supports increases in economic freedom, and so on. The downside of this is that it also implies a negative loop for those countries that are low in any of these three areas.
The results are slightly different when using the Polity II democratic capital measure. I have also demonstrated that econometric results are sensitive to the measure of democratic capital employed. This sensitivity helps to explain the conflicting results in this line of research.
Using a fixed effects model with in-panel AR(1) disturbances, I show that GDP per capita depends on lags of itself, economic freedom, and democratic capital. Based on these results the relationship between GDP per capita and democratic capital is either direct or indirect, depending on which measure is used. Further analysis, using Granger causality tests, support the indirect relationship of democratic capital acting through economic freedom to positively influence prosperity.
VI. FURTHER RESEARCH
The depreciation used to calculate the various measures of democratic capital are based on calibration of a different model. One extension would be to calibrate each of these measures separately. Given that two of the measures are based on binary values while the other two have far larger ranges suggests that the depreciation rates should be different, although the different depreciations rates may not have a significant impact.
Another area of extension is to include other variables important to prosperity such as other types of capital and geographic factors. Including these requires dealing with more endogeneity issues but it will also reduce the unidentified factors that are currently being absorbed into the country fixed effects and would lend further strength to these arguments.
